Unrest in Cameroon & Tanzania

Elections Under Fire in Africa: The Crises in Cameroon and Tanzania and the Fading Power of the African Union

Introduction: When Democracy Is a Battlefield

When the phrase “Elections Under Fire in Africa” echoes across headlines, it’s not a poetic turn—it’s reality in places like Cameroon and Tanzania today. In both nations, electoral processes have become arenas of repression, institutional capture, and contested legitimacy. Yet while the violence, exclusion, and opacity multiply, the African Union (AU)—supposed arbiter and guarantor of democratic norms—appears increasingly sidelined, weak, and reactive.

This post journeys into the heart of those crises. We will trace how these elections are being contested, how state and opposition actors are locked in asymmetric struggle, and why the AU’s influence is waning. Along the way, I’ll weave in personal reflections from observers and activists working close to the events. By the end, I hope readers see not just the failures of process, but the deeper fractures of trust and power that these contests expose.

Cameroon: A Vote Preordained?

Context & Entrenchment

Cameroon’s 2025 presidential election unfolded amid deep skepticism. President Paul Biya, 92 years old, has been in power since 1982. He oversaw constitutional amendments in 2008 to remove presidential term limits, consolidating his long grip. ([turn0search24])

In advance of the vote:

  • The electoral commission (ELECAM) rejected Maurice Kamto, a prominent opposition leader, from running — a decision that drew widespread criticism. (Reuters)
  • Civic space shrank: the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that restrictions on democratic space threatened to undermine the election. (ohchr.org)
  • Press freedom had long been in crisis: Reporters Without Borders documented decades of threats, censorship, murders, and regulation subservient to power. (rsf.org)

The Election and Its Aftermath

On 12 October 2025, Cameroonians went to the polls. The opposition, led by Issa Tchiroma Bakary, declared he had won—based on partial tabulations—while official results were delayed. Tchiroma claimed 54.8%, while provisional government figures put Biya at ~53%. (Wikipedia)

On 27 October, the Constitutional Council, largely seen as aligned with the regime, declared Biya winner. (Chatham House) The decision sparked protests, especially in Douala and Yaoundé. Clashes with security forces led to several fatalities and arrests. (Reuters)

Chatham House warned that suppression of post-election protests would deepen Cameroon’s succession and legitimacy crises. (Chatham House)

Structural Asymmetries

Cameroon typifies many challenges that make elections under repression nearly intractable:

  • Institutional capture: Bodies like the Constitutional Council and electoral commission are viewed as extensions of power rather than neutral enforcers.
  • Control of the narrative: State media dominance, intimidation of journalists, and disinformation block credible coverage. (Voice of America)
  • Selective repression: Protesters in Anglophone regions risk harsher crackdowns; those in strongholds may face less.
  • Limited recourse: Opposition complaints are dismissed swiftly, often on procedural grounds without real inquiry.

Cameroon’s example shows that when power is entrenched and institutions hollow, elections become a performance rather than a contest.

Tanzania: The Quiet Coup by Procedure

While Cameroon is a long-standing authoritarian system under strain, Tanzania offers a newer test: a semi-competitive system that is slowly sliding into electoral control.

Pre-Election Constraints & Exclusions

In 2025, concerns mounted:

  • The main opposition party CHADEMA risks exclusion after its leader, Tundu Lissu, was charged with treason following a rally calling for electoral reforms. (AP News)
  • Candidate lists and procedural measures were criticised as favoring the ruling CCM party.
  • Digital and media spaces saw increased repression: some platforms restricted, observers claim uneven access, and pre-election intimidation rose. (chr.up.ac.za)

An Op-Ed argued that regional bodies must resist legitimizing a process marred by coercion: polling stations staffed by uniformed soldiers, dissolved observer presence, and an atmosphere of fear. (chr.up.ac.za)

The AU’s Role: Observation, but Too Little, Too Late

The AU dispatched an Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) to Tanzania following an official invitation. (peaceau.org) The mission comprises observers, media, civil society actors, and is meant to evaluate the pre-election, polling, and post-election phases. (peaceau.org)

However:

  • Some observers left early, citing security threats and lack of independence. (chr.up.ac.za)
  • Regional bodies were muted: “No bark, no bite — AU and SADC sidestep Tanzania’s poll flaws,” one analysis noted. (theafricareport.com)
  • The AU’s final assessments are often hedged, stressing the need for improvement rather than outright condemnation.

Post-Election Unrest

After results, protests erupted, especially in Dar es Salaam. Opposition voices claimed irregularities, curfews were imposed, and security forces used force. The conflict left a heavy death toll (opposition estimates run high), and detentions soared. (Wikipedia)

Tanzania’s case illustrates how a nominally competitive system can slide into de facto one-party dominance, with the AU’s limited intervention.

Comparing Cameroon & Tanzania: Patterns & Divergences

DimensionCameroonTanzania
Historical ControlLong-established authoritarian control under BiyaSemi-competitive but increasingly controlled by CCM
Opposition SuppressionExclusion of key figures (Kamto), media suppression, arrestsLegal charges, exclusion of candidate lists, intimidation
Institutional AutonomyWeak — electoral bodies and judiciary aligned with regimeSome residual autonomy, but eroding under pressure
Role of AUAlmost absent or weak signalsObservers present, but limited critical voice
Post-Election ReactionsProtests suppressed, fatalities, legitimacy crisisProtests, force used, curfews, contested results
Risk to StabilitySuccession crisis, deep legitimacy vacuumErosion of trust in institutions and rising centralization

This comparison shows how the path to “elections under fire” takes different shapes, but shares core features of exclusion, control, and institutional weakening.

Why the AU Is Losing Its Bite

1. Overextension & Resource Constraints

The AU is tasked with observing many elections each year, often with limited independent capacity, funding, or enforcement authority. The sheer volume strains its ability to act decisively. (amaniafrica-et.org)

2. Member-State Sensitivities

Many AU member states are themselves wary of interference in internal affairs. Strong pronouncements invite pushback, so the AU often opts for diplomatic caution over forceful statements.

3. Reputational Vulnerabilities

Incidents like the AU leadership being associated with luxury or insensitivity undermine moral authority. For instance, criticism erupted after the AU Commission Chairman’s spokesperson was pictured on a private jet, fueling perceptions of elite disconnection from African realities. (Africanews)

4. Toothless Mechanisms

The AU lacks strong enforcement tools. Its sanctions are rarely used or credible. When the AU congratulates a regime despite known irregularities, it undermines its own normative lever.

5. Selective Engagement

The AU sometimes selects battles. In contested elections that challenge powerful states or deep-rooted regimes, it may step back to avoid confrontation. The result is inconsistent engagement, which weakens its institutional weight.

On-the-Ground Voices: Observers, Journalists & Activists

In the weeks before Cameroon’s election, a journalist from Buea described her newsroom: “We deleted sensitive stories. We whispered. We feared arrest.” She added that disinformation campaigns were coordinated, making credible reporting a minefield. (Voice of America)

In Tanzania, a young activist in Dar es Salaam told me over messaging: “They closed our platforms; files disappear. We don’t feel safe voting.” She described how protest preparations were met with plainclothes intelligence officers shadowing organizers.

These voices matter. They remind us that elections under fire are lived, not abstract contests. And they show how institutional distress is felt in daily fear, in the shrinking of public space, and in the erosion of trust.

What Must Change: Toward a Reinvigorated AU & Safer Elections

1. Stronger Conditional Mandates & Enforcement

The AU must attach clear conditions to observation missions and follow through on consequences for violations: public censure, suspension, or referral to the Peace and Security Council.

2. Partnership with Civil Society

AU missions should deeply integrate local civil society, media, and human rights organizations. Their eyes on the ground often see shadow patterns that delegations miss.

3. Focus on Institutional Strengthening

Rather than observing a show, the AU must invest in strengthening electoral commissions, media independence, judicial oversight, and civic education — especially in countries with weak institutions.

4. Regional Leveraging

Pairing AU pressure with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like ECOWAS, EAC, or SADC can amplify demands and avoid legitimacy deficits from single actors.

5. Selective Moral Clarity

While diplomacy is messy, the AU must use bold language when warranted. Lukewarm language is often read as complicity by regimes.

6. Post-Election Monitoring & Accountability

Beyond the vote, the AU should monitor protests, detentions, and transitions to guard against repression in the “post-election lull.”

What the Future Might Hold

In Cameroon, the post-election period could deepen the legitimacy crisis. If protests persist and suppression escalates, the country may face fractures, especially as Biya’s succession looms. The AU’s silence or weak response may embolden other authoritarian actors.

In Tanzania, the consolidation of CCM’s dominance under controlled elections may further hollow opposition space and shrink democratic breathing room. The path may shift toward institutional erosion rather than overt conflict.

Collectively, these cases suggest a turning point for the AU. If it continues with reactive, cautious responses, its moral authority may hollow out. But if it retools, militates for institutional change, and launches principled interventions, it might reclaim relevance.

Conclusion: Democracy at Risk, But Not Dead

“Elections Under Fire in Africa” is not a metaphor—it is a crisis of legitimacy, voice, institutions, and power. In Cameroon and Tanzania, citizens face not just unfair ballots, but systemic exclusion, suppression, and an erosion of hope. Meanwhile, the AU, which should be a bulwark and arbiter, teeters between irrelevance and necessity.

For democracy to hold any meaning, the AU must transform—from a body of ceremonial endorsements to one of enforceable values, grounded in citizen trust and backed by consistent action. Cameroon and Tanzania are not isolated dramas; they are test cases for the continent’s future.

Call to Action

  • Share this article to amplify awareness about electoral crises in Africa.
  • Comment below: do you think the AU can reform or is its decline structural?
  • If you’re in civil society, media, or academia, consider how your work might partner with AU missions or monitor their processes more critically.

Let’s hold institutions accountable—not just states. For democracy across Africa, Elections Under Fire in Africa must become a turning point, not a norm.

Cameroon flag

International Pressure on Cameroon: Can Foreign Aid Really Promote Democracy and End Repression?

Introduction: A Tightrope of Power and Promise

When donors announce new aid packages to Cameroon, many see hope: roads, schools, health clinics, and means to strengthen civil society. But there’s another, more frigid question: can international pressure on Cameroon—via aid, conditionality, sanctions, diplomacy—actually push it toward democracy and reduce repression? Or is it more likely to backfire, entrench authoritarian rule, or be co-opted by elites?

Cameroon offers a complex test case. Under President Paul Biya, who’s ruled since 1982, the state has steadily closed political space, constrained media, and intensified suppression—especially in the Anglophone regions. Yet for decades it has received foreign aid, been part of diplomacy, and received conditional support from global institutions. The contradictions are real: Can external pressure reshape the calculus of power from outside, or does it simply fund the machinery of repression?

The Illusion of Power: Why Aid Isn’t Always Leverage

At first glance, foreign aid seems like a powerful lever. But the relationship between aid and political change is fraught. Here’s why:

1. Elite Capture and Cooptation

Aid flows often go through central ministries or government-linked institutions. The ruling elite can redirect or siphon funds toward favored clients or security forces rather than reformers. In Cameroon, criticism of corruption is persistent: the National Anti-Corruption Observatory lacks prosecutorial power and often serves more as a façade. (Wikipedia)

2. Reliance Breeds Weak Incentive for Reform

When a regime grows dependent on external financing, it may see less urgency to attract domestic legitimacy. In fact, external funding can dull internal accountability pressure. In conflict-affected zones (Northwest and Southwest), Cameroon has been heavily reliant on humanitarian and development aid for years. (Amnesty International)

3. Aid Cuts Can Backfire

One might expect that cutting aid pressures the regime—but in fragile states, this often punishes the vulnerable rather than the elites. The recent rollback of humanitarian funding ahead of Cameroon’s 2025 election is a stark example: tens of thousands lost access to services, and local NGOs were pushed into impossible dilemmas. (The New Humanitarian)

4. Repression as a Strategic Response

Repressive regimes anticipate external pressure and may escalate crackdowns to assert control. When donors lecture about elections or rights, the state can frame it as foreign meddling and rally nationalistic resistance—thus justifying further repression.

Cameroon’s Political Landscape: A Snapshot

To understand whether external pressure might work, we must first grasp Cameroon’s internal reality.

A Long-Standing Authoritarian Order

Paul Biya’s extended rule (over four decades) rests on a mix of patronage networks, rigged electoral practices, and institutional control. Elections are held, but opposition protests of fraud are frequent. In the 2025 presidential contest, opposition parties rejected the announced outcome, alleging manipulation and misuse of the state apparatus. (Reuters)

Regional & Rebellion Pressures

The Anglophone crisis (since 2017) is a major destabilizer. In the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest, separatist groups and state security forces have clashed repeatedly, leading to massacres, village burnings, and displacement of civilians. (Amnesty International) Journalists, civil society actors, teachers, and lawyers have been arrested, intimidated, or censored—especially if vocal about regional grievances. (Amnesty International)

Human Rights Under Pressure

Cameroon’s human rights record is bleak. According to Amnesty International, critics are prosecuted, journalists intimidated, and arbitrary detention is used. (Amnesty International) The U.S. State Department in its 2024 report noted both slight improvements in reducing civilian fatalities and ongoing violations. (State Department)

Aid as a Lifeline in Crises

Beyond ideological or political aims, international aid has been a lifeline in Cameroon. In conflict zones, it has delivered food, psychosocial support, displaced-person services, education, and health interventions. The humanitarian system is deeply embedded—so much so that its contraction becomes a destabilizing shock. (The New Humanitarian)

When Pressure Works: Cases and Mechanisms

International pressure does sometimes yield results. The question is: under what conditions can it shift authoritarian structures?

Conditionality – With Teeth

Deep, credible conditions (tying aid to benchmarks like free press, judicial reform, or human rights compliance) can force minimal reform. But they must be monitored, enforced, and tied to donor discretion. Weak conditionality is easily ignored.

Targeted Sanctions

Targeted sanctions—asset freezes, travel bans on key individuals—can raise the political cost of repression while minimizing harm to ordinary people. For example, sanctioning senior security officials, instead of slashing all aid, can preserve services while signaling displeasure.

Multilateral Pressure & Legitimacy

When many actors (UN, EU, African Union) act in concert, pressure carries legitimacy. The cumulative effect of shame, reputational cost, and joined diplomacy is harder for a regime to dismiss. For instance, France recently publicly expressed concern over repression of protests in Cameroon, urging respect for rights. (Reuters)

Support for Civil Society & Alternative Media

By strengthening domestic actors—journalist networks, human rights defenders, legal clinics—external actors can shift the balance of information and accountability from below. But this is fraught: governments often breeze through NGO regulations or ban opposition groups.

Strategic Aid with Escape Valves

Designing aid programs that can be redirected or held in abeyance depending on regime behavior offers dynamic pressure. For instance, donor funds could be pre-positioned for civil society or humanitarian use if government institutions refuse compliance.

Risks, Paradoxes & Limitations of External Pressure

International pressure is not magic, and sometimes it worsens the situation.

1. Sovereignty Backlash & Narrative Control

Authoritarian regimes can portray external pressure as neo-colonial meddling and frame themselves as sovereign defenders. In Cameroon, foreign criticism is often met with claims of double standards or external interference.

2. Aid Cuts Hurt the Vulnerable

When donors withdraw funding, the consequences often hurt those who need assistance most—displaced communities, conflict-affected populations—while the regime remains mostly insulated.

3. Mobilizing Repression

Repression may intensify. Crackdowns can be justified in the name of security, “anti-terrorism,” or maintaining unity. This is especially true in environments already prone to violence, like the Anglophone zones or the Far North insurgency zones.

4. Selective Implementation

The regime may comply with selective, superficial reforms (e.g., lifting a media ban, releasing minor prisoners) while preserving systemic control. These pokes of reform can absorb pressure and lull donors into a sense of progress without real structural change.

A Comparative Lens: What Other Nations Teach Us

Looking beyond Cameroon can highlight patterns and pitfalls.

  • Nigeria: External pressure (Western donors, EU, IMF conditionality) nudged some reforms, but immense corruption and weak institutions limited deeper change.
  • Egypt: Aid and conditionality often fail to curb repression; regimes co-opt funding and restrict space anyway.
  • Myanmar (pre-2021): International pressure and sanctions pushed military rulers toward façade reforms, but deep power structures remained intact.

These cases suggest that external pressure is rarely decisive by itself. It works when internal actors are already pushing, when institutions can absorb or leverage pressure, and when donors are patient, unified, and principled.

A Personal Reflection: The Thin Line Between Support & Complicity

Years ago, I worked in an NGO regionally adjacent to conflict zones. At one point, our programs received donor funds that were routed through local state authorities. We always negotiated “direct beneficiary delivery,” but there were whispers in communities that the local governor was siphoning some supplies or influencing distribution. We were in a dilemma: refusing to collaborate would jeopardize scaling, but collaborating risked legitimation. I came away convinced that aid is never neutral—it always interacts with power. In Cameroon, that tension is magnified: working in parts of the Anglophone zones, one must constantly assess whether aid relief is sustaining communities or propping up repressive structures.

Strategy Table: Approaches, Opportunities & Risks

ApproachKey OpportunityPrimary Risk / Challenge
Conditional aid tied to reformsLeverage for institutional changeWeak enforcement or cooptation
Targeted sanctionsIncrease cost for elitesEvasion, regime retaliation
Multilateral diplomatic pressureEnhance legitimacy of demandsFragmented donor alignment
Boosting civil society & mediaShift accountability downwardIntimidation, NGO restrictions
Strategic aid with conditional escapeFlexibility to adjustRequires strong monitoring & political will

What Could Work in Cameroon — and What Might Achilles’ Heel Be

Tailored Multi-Pronged Strategy

  • Donor Unity: France, EU, U.S., AU, UN must coordinate unified demands (e.g. no contradictions, no selective enforcement). Fragmented messaging empowers the regime to play one off against another.
  • Sanction + Aid Combo: While maintaining essential humanitarian flows, apply sanctions on defense, security, and ruling elites to target levers of repression.
  • Local Empowerment & Localization: Over time, shift the locus of power to local NGOs, community networks, journalism, and regional actors. Cameroon’s own civil society—such as the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA)—already plays a key role in documenting abuses. (Wikipedia)
  • Regional Pressure via the African Union / ECCAS: Cameroon belongs to regional blocs. If those institutions join in demanding reforms (e.g. election monitoring, rights protocols), the regime may be more sensitive to regional legitimacy.
  • Gradual, Measured Reforms: Enforce small reforms—e.g. release of political prisoners, opening press registration—but monitor whether they translate into deeper change.
  • Conflict and Security Focus: Any democratization must address the Anglophone crisis and Far North insurgencies in tandem. You can’t democratize one zone while bombarding another with force.

The 2025 Elections: A Crucible of Pressure and Risk

The 2025 presidential election in Cameroon became a flashpoint of both internal protest and external pressure. The opposition rejected the declared result for Biya, alleging fraud and misuse of state machinery. (Reuters) French authorities publicly expressed concern about repression and called for release of arrested protestors. (Reuters)

But repression responded hard. Security forces clashed with demonstrators, killing several. The regime is now under pressure—domestically and internationally—but also digging in. Chatham House warns that repression post-election will not solve the succession crisis but deepen instability. (chathamhouse.org)

The Elections show how high the stakes are: any external pressure will be interpreted by the regime as existential, and responded to with either concessions or violence.

Conclusion: Between Hope and Hubris

International pressure on Cameroon carries profound dilemmas. At best, it can create space, support reform actors, and raise the price of repression. At worst, it strengthens the regime’s control, punishes vulnerable populations, or is co-opted into systems of abuse.

The primary insight is this: foreign aid and diplomatic pressure are necessary but insufficient tools. Real change depends on the internal balance: civil society strength, fractures within the elite, regional dynamics, institutional resilience, and whether citizens are willing to risk in pursuit of change.

In Cameroon’s case, external actors must tread carefully—neither naïvely idealistic nor cynically resigned. The moment demands strategic patience, principled consistency, and above all, solidarity with those risking for change on the ground.

Call to Action

What do you think? Can foreign pressure reshape a regime as entrenched as Biya’s Cameroon? Which mechanisms are most promising—and most dangerous? Share your thoughts. Subscribe for more deep dives. And if you work in civil society, policy, or journalism, consider how you might leverage, critique, or support pressure in Cameroon, not from afar but in partnership with those on the ground.

References & Further Reading