Unrest in Cameroon & Tanzania

Elections Under Fire in Africa: The Crises in Cameroon and Tanzania and the Fading Power of the African Union

Introduction: When Democracy Is a Battlefield

When the phrase “Elections Under Fire in Africa” echoes across headlines, it’s not a poetic turn—it’s reality in places like Cameroon and Tanzania today. In both nations, electoral processes have become arenas of repression, institutional capture, and contested legitimacy. Yet while the violence, exclusion, and opacity multiply, the African Union (AU)—supposed arbiter and guarantor of democratic norms—appears increasingly sidelined, weak, and reactive.

This post journeys into the heart of those crises. We will trace how these elections are being contested, how state and opposition actors are locked in asymmetric struggle, and why the AU’s influence is waning. Along the way, I’ll weave in personal reflections from observers and activists working close to the events. By the end, I hope readers see not just the failures of process, but the deeper fractures of trust and power that these contests expose.

Cameroon: A Vote Preordained?

Context & Entrenchment

Cameroon’s 2025 presidential election unfolded amid deep skepticism. President Paul Biya, 92 years old, has been in power since 1982. He oversaw constitutional amendments in 2008 to remove presidential term limits, consolidating his long grip. ([turn0search24])

In advance of the vote:

  • The electoral commission (ELECAM) rejected Maurice Kamto, a prominent opposition leader, from running — a decision that drew widespread criticism. (Reuters)
  • Civic space shrank: the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that restrictions on democratic space threatened to undermine the election. (ohchr.org)
  • Press freedom had long been in crisis: Reporters Without Borders documented decades of threats, censorship, murders, and regulation subservient to power. (rsf.org)

The Election and Its Aftermath

On 12 October 2025, Cameroonians went to the polls. The opposition, led by Issa Tchiroma Bakary, declared he had won—based on partial tabulations—while official results were delayed. Tchiroma claimed 54.8%, while provisional government figures put Biya at ~53%. (Wikipedia)

On 27 October, the Constitutional Council, largely seen as aligned with the regime, declared Biya winner. (Chatham House) The decision sparked protests, especially in Douala and Yaoundé. Clashes with security forces led to several fatalities and arrests. (Reuters)

Chatham House warned that suppression of post-election protests would deepen Cameroon’s succession and legitimacy crises. (Chatham House)

Structural Asymmetries

Cameroon typifies many challenges that make elections under repression nearly intractable:

  • Institutional capture: Bodies like the Constitutional Council and electoral commission are viewed as extensions of power rather than neutral enforcers.
  • Control of the narrative: State media dominance, intimidation of journalists, and disinformation block credible coverage. (Voice of America)
  • Selective repression: Protesters in Anglophone regions risk harsher crackdowns; those in strongholds may face less.
  • Limited recourse: Opposition complaints are dismissed swiftly, often on procedural grounds without real inquiry.

Cameroon’s example shows that when power is entrenched and institutions hollow, elections become a performance rather than a contest.

Tanzania: The Quiet Coup by Procedure

While Cameroon is a long-standing authoritarian system under strain, Tanzania offers a newer test: a semi-competitive system that is slowly sliding into electoral control.

Pre-Election Constraints & Exclusions

In 2025, concerns mounted:

  • The main opposition party CHADEMA risks exclusion after its leader, Tundu Lissu, was charged with treason following a rally calling for electoral reforms. (AP News)
  • Candidate lists and procedural measures were criticised as favoring the ruling CCM party.
  • Digital and media spaces saw increased repression: some platforms restricted, observers claim uneven access, and pre-election intimidation rose. (chr.up.ac.za)

An Op-Ed argued that regional bodies must resist legitimizing a process marred by coercion: polling stations staffed by uniformed soldiers, dissolved observer presence, and an atmosphere of fear. (chr.up.ac.za)

The AU’s Role: Observation, but Too Little, Too Late

The AU dispatched an Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) to Tanzania following an official invitation. (peaceau.org) The mission comprises observers, media, civil society actors, and is meant to evaluate the pre-election, polling, and post-election phases. (peaceau.org)

However:

  • Some observers left early, citing security threats and lack of independence. (chr.up.ac.za)
  • Regional bodies were muted: “No bark, no bite — AU and SADC sidestep Tanzania’s poll flaws,” one analysis noted. (theafricareport.com)
  • The AU’s final assessments are often hedged, stressing the need for improvement rather than outright condemnation.

Post-Election Unrest

After results, protests erupted, especially in Dar es Salaam. Opposition voices claimed irregularities, curfews were imposed, and security forces used force. The conflict left a heavy death toll (opposition estimates run high), and detentions soared. (Wikipedia)

Tanzania’s case illustrates how a nominally competitive system can slide into de facto one-party dominance, with the AU’s limited intervention.

Comparing Cameroon & Tanzania: Patterns & Divergences

DimensionCameroonTanzania
Historical ControlLong-established authoritarian control under BiyaSemi-competitive but increasingly controlled by CCM
Opposition SuppressionExclusion of key figures (Kamto), media suppression, arrestsLegal charges, exclusion of candidate lists, intimidation
Institutional AutonomyWeak — electoral bodies and judiciary aligned with regimeSome residual autonomy, but eroding under pressure
Role of AUAlmost absent or weak signalsObservers present, but limited critical voice
Post-Election ReactionsProtests suppressed, fatalities, legitimacy crisisProtests, force used, curfews, contested results
Risk to StabilitySuccession crisis, deep legitimacy vacuumErosion of trust in institutions and rising centralization

This comparison shows how the path to “elections under fire” takes different shapes, but shares core features of exclusion, control, and institutional weakening.

Why the AU Is Losing Its Bite

1. Overextension & Resource Constraints

The AU is tasked with observing many elections each year, often with limited independent capacity, funding, or enforcement authority. The sheer volume strains its ability to act decisively. (amaniafrica-et.org)

2. Member-State Sensitivities

Many AU member states are themselves wary of interference in internal affairs. Strong pronouncements invite pushback, so the AU often opts for diplomatic caution over forceful statements.

3. Reputational Vulnerabilities

Incidents like the AU leadership being associated with luxury or insensitivity undermine moral authority. For instance, criticism erupted after the AU Commission Chairman’s spokesperson was pictured on a private jet, fueling perceptions of elite disconnection from African realities. (Africanews)

4. Toothless Mechanisms

The AU lacks strong enforcement tools. Its sanctions are rarely used or credible. When the AU congratulates a regime despite known irregularities, it undermines its own normative lever.

5. Selective Engagement

The AU sometimes selects battles. In contested elections that challenge powerful states or deep-rooted regimes, it may step back to avoid confrontation. The result is inconsistent engagement, which weakens its institutional weight.

On-the-Ground Voices: Observers, Journalists & Activists

In the weeks before Cameroon’s election, a journalist from Buea described her newsroom: “We deleted sensitive stories. We whispered. We feared arrest.” She added that disinformation campaigns were coordinated, making credible reporting a minefield. (Voice of America)

In Tanzania, a young activist in Dar es Salaam told me over messaging: “They closed our platforms; files disappear. We don’t feel safe voting.” She described how protest preparations were met with plainclothes intelligence officers shadowing organizers.

These voices matter. They remind us that elections under fire are lived, not abstract contests. And they show how institutional distress is felt in daily fear, in the shrinking of public space, and in the erosion of trust.

What Must Change: Toward a Reinvigorated AU & Safer Elections

1. Stronger Conditional Mandates & Enforcement

The AU must attach clear conditions to observation missions and follow through on consequences for violations: public censure, suspension, or referral to the Peace and Security Council.

2. Partnership with Civil Society

AU missions should deeply integrate local civil society, media, and human rights organizations. Their eyes on the ground often see shadow patterns that delegations miss.

3. Focus on Institutional Strengthening

Rather than observing a show, the AU must invest in strengthening electoral commissions, media independence, judicial oversight, and civic education — especially in countries with weak institutions.

4. Regional Leveraging

Pairing AU pressure with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like ECOWAS, EAC, or SADC can amplify demands and avoid legitimacy deficits from single actors.

5. Selective Moral Clarity

While diplomacy is messy, the AU must use bold language when warranted. Lukewarm language is often read as complicity by regimes.

6. Post-Election Monitoring & Accountability

Beyond the vote, the AU should monitor protests, detentions, and transitions to guard against repression in the “post-election lull.”

What the Future Might Hold

In Cameroon, the post-election period could deepen the legitimacy crisis. If protests persist and suppression escalates, the country may face fractures, especially as Biya’s succession looms. The AU’s silence or weak response may embolden other authoritarian actors.

In Tanzania, the consolidation of CCM’s dominance under controlled elections may further hollow opposition space and shrink democratic breathing room. The path may shift toward institutional erosion rather than overt conflict.

Collectively, these cases suggest a turning point for the AU. If it continues with reactive, cautious responses, its moral authority may hollow out. But if it retools, militates for institutional change, and launches principled interventions, it might reclaim relevance.

Conclusion: Democracy at Risk, But Not Dead

“Elections Under Fire in Africa” is not a metaphor—it is a crisis of legitimacy, voice, institutions, and power. In Cameroon and Tanzania, citizens face not just unfair ballots, but systemic exclusion, suppression, and an erosion of hope. Meanwhile, the AU, which should be a bulwark and arbiter, teeters between irrelevance and necessity.

For democracy to hold any meaning, the AU must transform—from a body of ceremonial endorsements to one of enforceable values, grounded in citizen trust and backed by consistent action. Cameroon and Tanzania are not isolated dramas; they are test cases for the continent’s future.

Call to Action

  • Share this article to amplify awareness about electoral crises in Africa.
  • Comment below: do you think the AU can reform or is its decline structural?
  • If you’re in civil society, media, or academia, consider how your work might partner with AU missions or monitor their processes more critically.

Let’s hold institutions accountable—not just states. For democracy across Africa, Elections Under Fire in Africa must become a turning point, not a norm.

African-Union-Headquarters

Legitimizing Tyranny: The African Union’s Complicity in Africa’s Democratic Collapse

Introduction: A Betrayal You Can’t Ignore

When an organization pledges to uphold democracy—but then congratulates autocrats who came to power through manipulated or sham elections—it doesn’t merely lose credibility. It becomes a propagandist, a facilitator of tyranny. The African Union’s complicity in Africa’s democratic collapse is not an accident or oversight. It is a pattern. This is not subtle; it is betrayal. And Africans are paying the price.

In this post, I will expose how the AU’s actions—or inactions—have given impunity to dictators, legitimized fraudulent elections, and betrayed the very people the Union claims to represent. I draw on documented cases, institutional frameworks, and ground realities to show that the AU has, time and again, abandoned its founding principles and become a tool for the powerful to silence the powerless.

1. The AU’s Democratic Charter vs. Its Practice

1.1. The promise, the charter, the hypocrisy

The African Union was born with lofty declarations. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ADC), adopted in 2007, was intended to make constitutionalism, good governance, and democracy binding values among AU member states. It explicitly condemns unconstitutional changes of government. (African Union)

Yet, in practice, many of those same member states that signed on to the ADC have engaged in systematic electoral manipulation. The AU’s institutional machinery—its Peace and Security Council, its election mission units, its “norms”—are invoked only when politically convenient or as window dressing.

1.2. The anti-coup norm: a hollow threat

In theory, the AU’s anti-coup norm is a mechanism to punish states that experience regime change by force. But what happens when a military junta rebrands itself, hosts a rigged “election,” and demands recognition? The AU often blinks.

For example, in Chad, after a military takeover, the AU’s Peace & Security Council declared that coup leaders should not run in elections—but Mahamat Idriss Déby (who led the transitional regime) contested anyway. The AU issued condemnations, but ultimately accepted the result, undermining its own rules. (Amani Africa)

This is not unique to Chad. The pattern is consistent: coup → transitional government → “election” → congratulations. The anti-coup norm is thus exposed as symbolic, not binding.

2. Congratulating Fraud: Cases Where the AU Enabled Dictators

If you want to see complicity in action, look at instances where the AU mission declared elections “credible,” while evidence screamed otherwise.

2.1. Ethiopia 2015: “Peaceful and credible” under suppression

In the 2015 general election in Ethiopia, the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) claimed a clean sweep. But even diplomatic observers documented severe repression: arrest of opposition leaders, closure of media outlets, harassment of dissenting voices. (Wikipedia)

The African Union Observation Mission nonetheless described the process as “calm, peaceful, and credible.” That language is chilling in its understatement—“credible” in a context where constitutional rights were suppressed. By giving that stamp, the AU effectively endorsed the result, regardless of the structural injustices behind it.

2.2. Cameroon 2025: Silence in the face of electoral standoff

Cameroon’s October 2025 presidential election, marred by claims of widespread intimidation and voter suppression, drew sharp criticism from civil society. The AU mission presence was muted and did little to challenge the result, effectively giving tacit legitimacy to Paul Biya’s regime. (Crisis Group)

Local reports document activists forcibly barred from campaigning, selective arrests, and internet blackouts. But the AU offered platitudes, not pressure—and that silence is complicity.

2.3. Madagascar coup recognition—or at least toleration

In 2025, Madagascar’s military ousted President Rajoelina and installed a transitional leader. According to reporting, the AU suspended Madagascar—but made lukewarm statements and is allowing the regime a timeline to hold elections (18 to 24 months). Many analysts see this as effectively legitimizing the coup’s outcomes. (The Guardian)

When the AU treats regime change by force as negotiable, it signals to others that constitutional order is weak, optional, or secondary.

3. Why the AU Betrays Africa: Political Incentives & Structural Flaws

To understand why the AU behaves this way, we must examine its structural incentives and external dependencies.

3.1. Leaders policing themselves

The AU is a union of heads of state. Its policies are determined by consensus or “peer diplomacy.” That means the Commission often defers to powerful members rather than enforcing norms. Autocratic presidents don’t vote themselves out of power—so there’s little internal pressure to punish one another.

3.2. Donor leverage & foreign influence

The AU relies on donor funding from European and global institutions. Its budgets are partially underwritten by external partners who often shy from conflict. That external dependency encourages diplomatic caution rather than strong action. The Union seldom wants to alienate powerful states (both African and non-African) that fund its operations.

3.3. The legitimacy vacuum

Many Africans see their national institutions as corrupt, weak, or captured by elites. They look to the AU for oversight—moral authority, legitimacy, accountability. By failing to act decisively, the AU intensifies a vacuum of moral authority. When the AU praises autocrats, it hands legitimacy to regimes that should be delegitimized.

4. The Cost to Citizens: How Complicity Erodes Democracy

This is not abstract. AU compliance with tyranny translates into real suffering and institutional decay.

4.1. Perpetual impunity

When leaders are never held accountable—even when electoral fraud is obvious—they internalize impunity. This emboldens further abuses: arbitrary arrests, arbitrary constitutional changes, suppression of media and civil society.

4.2. Cynical disengagement among citizens

Young Africans, with mobile phones and access to global ideas, see these patterns. When they observe that elections change nothing, confidence in democratic processes erodes. Citizens withdraw, apathy rises, reactions turn to protest or radicalization. Democracy loses legitimacy.

4.3. Weak institutions, constant instability

Because the AU fails to enforce norms, domestic institutions remain perpetually weak. Judiciary, legislature, media are captured. Opposition is suppressed. Political succession becomes a power struggle, often violent or orchestrated via coups.

5. Breaking the Illusion: What the AU Must Do to Redeem Itself

To stop being the facilitator of tyranny, the AU must transform. Here are bold reforms it must adopt—or be replaced in credibility.

5.1. Make norms binding, not optional

Ratify stronger enforcement — e.g., automatic sanctions for constitutional changes or leaders who blatantly rig elections. The AU should no longer rely solely on voluntary compliance.

5.2. Independent, empowered Election Integrity Body

Instead of ad hoc missions, the AU should establish a permanent, independent Electoral Integrity Commission with investigative and sanction powers, staffed by civil society, continental experts, and peer review panels.

5.3. Transparency in mission reports & naming names

AU observation reports should be public and explicit—not bland rhetoric. When elections are rigged, state it clearly. Name offending parties. Recommend remedial steps. Benchmark standards with global election integrity indices.

5.4. Strengthen civil society & civic rights monitoring

AU needs to offer protection and backing to civil society, human rights defenders, journalists. It must defend them when regimes crack down, rather than retreating in fear.

5.5. Decouple from donor control — fund for independence

Establish a stable funding mechanism (e.g. contributions from AU member states, continental development bank, unified budget) that reduces reliance on external donors whose geopolitical interests may compromise independence.

6. Final Reflection: The AU’s Choice—Salvation or Surrender

The African Union began as the successor to the OAU, envisioned as the organization that would transcend colonial legacies, enforce decolonization, and protect the dignity of African people. But today, the AU risks becoming precisely what many independence-era leaders feared: an instrument of political elites, a gatekeeper of impunity.

By legitimizing tyranny—through congratulatory statements, neutered norms, and abdication of responsibility—the AU betrays its founding vision and the millions of Africans who believed in its promise. Every time it applauds a phony election, it hands the tools of tyranny to regimes and marginalizes citizens.

The AU must choose: honor its oath of democracy, or continue its descent into irrelevance and shame.

Table: AU’s Complicity vs. What It Should Practice

Behavior (AU’s current role)Result / DamageWhat It Should Do Instead
Congratulating fraudulent electionsLegitimizes dictatorship, undermines domestic resistanceIssue clear rejections; refuse recognition until auditable results
Weak sanctions or suspensionAllows regime continuityEnforce automatic sanctions, freeze member privileges
Soft observation reportsLegitimacy language masks realityPublish sharp, independent reports and corrective demands
Deferred disciplineNorms become optionalMake enforcement binding, not discretionary
Silence towards rights suppressionComplicity in human rights violationsIntervene diplomatically, support NGOs & victims

Call to Action (CTA)

If you believe Africa deserves better, join me in exposing this complicity. Share this post, debate in your communities, and support independent voices that challenge hypocrisy. Let us demand that the AU become a real protector of people — not presidents. Sign up for updates, share your stories, or support organizations working for electoral integrity in Africa.